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Abstract We examine whether economic and military competence of political leaders
affect their duration in office. We introduce leader heterogeneity in the selectorate theory
of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and derive the hypothesis that in the presence of a
revolutionary threat, economic competence is negatively related to political survival, but
that the effect is moderated by the size of the winning coalition. As military and economic
competence are negatively correlated, the opposite holds for military competence. We
present empirical estimates using proxies for military and economic competence in a
parametric Weibull duration model that support our theoretical predictions.
Keywords Political leader  Survival analysis  Leader competence  Selectorate theory
JEL Classification D020  D720  D740  O120
1 Introduction
Even though almost all political leaders enter office with the aim of maximizing tenure, we
observe wide variety in actual tenure throughout the world. Whereas King Sobuhza II of
Swaziland stayed in power for 62 years, many leaders do not stay in power for more than a
few years. The variation in tenure of political leaders across and within countries has led to
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analysis, these studies mainly have focused on political, institutional, and economic
variables to explain office length.1
Political leaders can maximize their time in office in different ways. They can increase
the welfare of all citizens or may choose only to assure the welfare of a small elite to
safeguard their position. Political leaders can also stay in power through repression. In this
paper, we examine how the competence levels of political leaders with respect to welfare
maximization and repression influence their political survival. We study this relation both
theoretically and empirically.
We develop a model, which is based on the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2003), but has the novel feature that it allows for heterogeneous leaders. We evaluate
the implications of the trade-off between economic and military competence by studying
the interaction between the winning coalition, i.e., the group of elites who can prioritize its
leader choice, and the opposition, i.e., the majority of citizens, that can initiate a revolu-
tion. In our model, we incorporate the finding of Besley et al. (2011) that better educated
leaders are economically more competent and generate more output that is allocated to
public goods and private rents. More economically competent leaders seem to appeal to
both the elite and the opposition. However, economic competence comes at the cost of
military competence. The latter is important, as military competence is required to fend off
revolutionary attempts and to safeguard the position of the current elite and their access to
rents.
From our model, we derive the hypothesis that even though the members of the winning
coalition obtain more private rents from an economically competent leader, they will favor
one with more military experience when the size of the winning coalition is small. The
reason is that the risk of losing coalition membership outweighs the immediate benefit of
economic prosperity under a more economically competent leader. As private rents need to
be shared among the winning coalition members, a small coalition implies that, ceteris
paribus, fewer rents have to be shared and therefore increases the value of having a more
military competent leader. On the other hand, when winning coalitions are large, public
goods become relatively more important and coalition members are more likely to favor an
economically competent political leader.
We find empirical support for our hypothesis when we add proxies for economic and
military competence to the empirical models as used by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2010). That is, we estimate a parametric Weibull duration model on a sample of more than
a 1000 political leaders for the period 1875–2004. Our samples focus on autocratic political
leaders and leaders confronted with political uprising. The results are robust to alternative
model specifications, different subsamples, and measures of economic competence.
By introducing leader heterogeneity into the selectorate theory, we bridge the gap
between the empirical literature emphasizing the relevance of leader characteristics for
economic and political outcomes, and the theoretical framework offered by the selectorate
theory to study leader survival. Connecting these strands of the literature teaches us that
political regimes facing the threat of revolution do not only select leaders of low economic
competence (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011), but the impact of competent leaders is also
constrained as office duration is likely to be short. As such, weak polities find themselves
in a poverty trap because the ruling elite will always prefer a strong military leader above
an economically competent one.
1 See, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010); Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995); Przeworski and
Gandhi (2007); Cuaresma et al. (2011) and Holcombe and Boudreaux (2013).
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we derive our hypothesis
on the basis of our theoretical model. Section 3 discusses our data and the duration
framework employed in our empirical analysis. In Sect. 4 the estimation results are pre-
sented. In Sect. 5 present several robustness analyses. In Sect. 6, we reflect on our findings
and conclude.
2 Theoretical model
We set up a formal model in which the winning coalition chooses a political leader in the
presence of a revolution threat from the opposition. Our model is based on the selectorate
theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). We take a setting similar to their model to build
a one-shot static model.2 After introducing the main concepts and the players in the model,
we continue to describe the timeline of the game and discuss the expected utility function
of each player. Then we describe the equilibrium and how the incumbent’s competence
level influences his survival rate. Finally, we derive the main hypothesis that we test in
Sect. 3.
2.1 The main concepts
2.1.1 The winning coalition and the opposition
Consider a mass of residents of size 1. A subset with political rights forms the selectorate
(S) with size, s, which ranges from 0 to 1. Selectorate membership depends on a mix of
characteristics such as birthplace, lineage and gender.3 Within the selectorate there is a
group of residents, called the winning coalition (W). It is the smallest group with political
power to choose a leader. The size of the winning coalition is equal to w, w 2 0; s½ . Here
we assume w and s to be exogenously given and fixed in order to focus on the impact of
leaders’ personal characteristics on their survival and how it differs in different regime
settings.4 The value of w depends on the distribution of political power and resources such
as arms, capital and abilities. In a military regime, w depends relatively more on the
distribution of arms and martial power, while it depends more on capital distribution in
advanced democracies.5
2 In contrast to the original selectorate theory model, our model is a one-shot game, wherein the winning
coalition faces the choice of replacing the incumbent with an unknown challenger. We model a one-shot
game to focus on the effect of competence on political survival and to keep the model simple. Extending the
model to two periods requires more structure, but does not change the result we derive in proposition 1
below.
3 For instance, in the United States, women were denied voting rights until the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1920. Thus, before that point, at least half of US residents
was not included in the selectorate. For more details, see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
4 Questions on how w and s are determined have been analyzed by Ray and Vohra (1999), Konishi and Ray
(2003), Acemoglu et al. (2008), and others. These studies look at the dynamics in winning coalition
formation. They analyze how institutions and the distribution of resources/political power affect the size and
stability of coalitions. Instead of furthering research in this direction, we focus on how existing coalitions
influence the selection of leaders.
5 The sizes of the selectorate and the winning coalition are related to the concepts of de facto and de jure
political powers, as discussed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). While de jure political power corresponds
to the political rights granted by law, de facto political power originates from resources. We argue that the
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To clarify the concepts of w and s, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) show that in a
directly elected presidential system, S amounts to all adults (i.e. s ¼ 1) and that support
from half of the selectorate in such a system ensures political survival (w ¼ s
2
). However, in
a Westminster type of parliamentary system, the leader needs to secure the support of half
of the people in half of the districts (w ¼ s
4
). Military juntas or monarchies have much
smaller selectorates and even smaller winning coalitions comprising by military elites or
aristocrats. For example, in the former Soviet Union, only communist party members were
part of the selectorate. Since party members accounted for less than 7 % of the entire
population (in the 1970s), the value of s was close to zero. At the same time, the Politburo
was in charge of selecting the political leader. Since the Politburo had only 14 full
members, w was even closer to zero.6
The mass of residents is divided into three disjoint sets: (1) residents that are not in the
selectorate (S), (2) residents that are in the selectorate but not in the winning coalition ( W),
and, finally, (3) residents that are in the winning coalition (W). The corresponding rep-
resentative members are Si, Wi and Wi and these representative members take the
respective group decisions. According to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), to maximize his
payoff, the incumbent would like to keep the winning coalition as small as possible and
maintain the same set of coalition members.7 Since W is the smallest group with political
power to select a leader, it follows that the joint political power of W and S is equivalent to
the power of W. The winning coalition and the opposition interact as follows: (1) the
winning coalition selects the leader; (2) the opposition ( W and S) can reject the decision of
the winning coalition and attempt a revolution; (3) a revolution attempt only occurs when
both W and S find it beneficial; (4) a revolution threat only materializes into a revolution
when the opposition solves the collective action problem and the incumbent is unable to
dismantle and appease the opposition. The threshold for posing a revolutionary threat and
the probability of having a revolution will be discussed in Sect. 2.3.
2.1.2 The candidates
The winning coalition chooses between two candidates: the incumbent (C0) and the
challenger (C1). Candidates have two dimensions of competence: economic competence
(ej; j ¼ 0; 1), and military competence (mj). Economic competence determines the level of
aggregate output (i.e. Y ¼ ej) and ej is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Military
competence determines the incumbent’s ability to turn down a revolution, i.e. the
incumbent can repress and dismantle the joint action to revolt from W and S with prob-
ability m0.
Footnote 5 continued
size of the selectorate represents the de jure democracy level while the size of winning coalition represents
the de facto democracy level.
6 See Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) for more detailed
explanations of these concepts and more examples.
7 The underlying reason is that in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) model, the output is divided into public
goods, private rents and payoffs to the incumbent. To maximize his payoff, the incumbent will minimize the
private rents shared among the winning coalition. Therefore, he would like the size of the winning coalition
to be just large enough to have the political power to select him at the equilibrium point. This implies that
W ¼ S þ W . However, that assumption is not essential to the results of our model. Since the revolution
threshold of W is always higher than that of S, whether to revolt or not is essentially determined by W .
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When the incumbent is in office, his economic competence is publicly observed through
the economic performance of the country. However, his military competence is not directly
observed. It is only revealed once he has to act upon an attempt. However, residents can
form an expectation about the incumbent’s military competence, i.e., E m0ð Þ. We assume
here that mj is negatively correlated with ej: E mj
  ¼ 1 aej8 where a a 2 0; 1½ ð Þ is a
known constant and indicates the correlation between ej and mj.
9
While the incumbent is known at the start of the game, the challenger is unknown. He
will be drawn randomly from the candidate pool after the winning coalition proposes its
leader of choice. The candidate pool includes candidates whose individual economic
competencies follows a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 (i.e., ej U 0; 1½ ). The
challenger’s economic competence is assumed to be revealed to the residents after the
winning coalition has made their leader choice.
Finally, in line with the selectorate theory, we assume that each candidate has a specific
winning coalition. The composition of the candidate-specific coalition is observed only
after the candidate assumes power. This implies that staying with the incumbent means no
change in the political setup. Furthermore, a peaceful transition to the challenger gives
each selectorate member a probability of w
s
of being in the new coalition.
2.1.3 Public goods and private rents
The level of aggregate output, determined by the leader’s economic competence, is divided
into public goods and private rents.10 A fixed fraction (x 2 0; 1ð Þ) of aggregate output goes
to private rents (denoted as zj) while a fraction 1 x of aggregate output is used to produce
public goods (denoted as gj).
11 Public goods are accessible to every selectorate member,
whereas private rents are shared equally by the winning coalition’s members. For sim-
plicity, we assume that public goods are produced according to a one-for-one production
8 Candidates’ true military competence equals mj ¼ 1 aej þ , where e, follows a normal distribution N
(0, 1). It accounts for the possibility that the opposition misjudges a leader’s military competence.
9 The assumption that leaders’ competence levels are negatively correlated is strongly supported by our
data, which will be described in detail in Sect. 3. One explanation for this negative association is that it takes
time to develop competence in either dimension. As time is scarce, other competences cannot be developed
sufficiently. For example, if the candidate has spent a long time serving in the military, then he would not
have had time to go to university.
10 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) assume that the leader can retain the difference between gov-
ernment revenue and the sum of public goods and private rents. They use this difference to measure leader
survival. Here we take a different approach and assume that the incumbent does not know exactly the
functional form determining his survival rate (which is decided by the winning coalition). He only knows
that his survival rate is a function that is strictly increasing in the extra benefits he can bring to the winning
coalition relative to the challenger. Therefore, in equilibrium, the incumbent will not keep any rents for
himself, but distributes aggregate output over public goods and private rents. This approach allows us to
focus on the impact of e0 in our analysis. To measure political survival we will focus on the difference
between the expected utility that a winning coalition member will have under the incumbent and the
(unknown) challenger.
11 In Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), the loyalty norm, i.e., the ratio of the size of winning coalition over
the size of the selectorate, is fixed. They show that it is optimal for the incumbent to choose the same set and
size of his winning coalition. We follow their approach and take the size of the selectorate (s) and the size of
the winning coalition (w) as given. Moreover, we also take x as given. The reason is that x can be considered
as a measure of income inequality, which hardly changes in the short-run. See Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003) for details.
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technology, with 1 unit of input producing 1 unit of public goods.12 Thus, each selectorate
member receives ej 1 xð Þ of public goods and private rents equal to ej xw. Since a winning
coalition member receives both public goods and private rents, he has the following payoff
function:
Uw ¼ zj þ gj ¼ ej 1 xð Þ þ ej
x
w
; for j 2 0; 1f g:
Furthermore, a selectorate member who is not a coalition member Wið Þ has access only
to public goods, whereas residents who are not in the selectorate Sið Þ have access neither to
public goods nor private rents:
U w ¼ zj ¼ ej 1 xð Þ; for j 2 0; 1f g
Us ¼ 0; for j 2 0; 1f g:
2.2 Timeline
Figure 1 visualizes the timeline of our one-shot static game. In words, it works as follows:
1. The incumbent is in power and his economic competence, e0, is publicly observed.
2. The winning coalition proposes the incumbent or an unknown challenger (that will
be drawn by nature in the step 3).
3. Nature draws the (so far unknown) challenger and his economic competence, e1, is
revealed.
4a. If the challenger is proposed, the opposition has two options, i.e., either to accept
the challenger or to pay a small cost, s, to reject the challenger and keep the
incumbent.13 In either case, Si remains disenfranchised.
4b. If the incumbent is proposed, the opposition decides whether to launch a
revolution, which destroys part (k) of aggregate output:
i. If the revolution condition is fulfilled and the incumbent cannot dismantle
it, a revolution succeeds with probability 1 E m1ð Þð Þ and the challenger
comes into power. The challenger democratizes the state by setting s to 1,
w to its possible maximum, and abolishes private rents, i.e., zj ¼ 0.14
ii. If no revolution occurs, the incumbent stays in power. He will keep the
regime settings constant and the sitting winning coalition remains.
5. The (new) leader comes into power and payoffs are realized.
12 Assuming different production costs for public goods does not change our results. A detailed proof is
available upon request.
13 We assume that the opposition needs to bear a rejection cost when the winning coalition proposes the
challenger. Since the winning coalition is ruling the regime, the opposition needs to engage in certain
activities such as lobbying, riots, or strikes, to reject the winning coalition’s proposal.
14 Since the incumbent represents the status quo, he will not democratize the state. Furthermore, political
structures (i.e., s and w) often remain the same after a successful revolution. Our results are not sensitive to
this assumption. Detailed proof is shown in the Appendix, which can be found at http://www.rug.nl/staff/r.
m.jong.a.pin/ and is available on request.
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2.3 The equilibrium
The challenger can come into power in two ways: (1) peacefully, i.e., being proposed by
the winning coalition, which will be followed by a reallocation of the citizens over the
winning coalition and the rest of the selectorate, or (2) violently, i.e., not being proposed by
the coalition but supported by the opposition in a revolution. Such a revolution, however,
will destroy part (k) of aggregate output.
In the following section, we use backward induction and describe the sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium. We start with the subgame wherein the challenger is proposed and
illustrate the best response of the opposition. Then we show under which conditions the
opposition will attempt a revolution. Finally, we show how the incumbent’s economic
competence level influences decision-making of the winning coalition when confronted
with a revolutionary threat.
2.3.1 When the challenger is proposed
If the winning coalition proposes the challenger, the opposition has two options, i.e., either
to accept the challenger or to pay a small cost, s, to reject the challenger and keep the
incumbent.15 Si is always better off by choosing the challenger. The reason is as follows:
After a peaceful leadership change, the winning coalition and the rest of the selectorate will
be reshuffled, but Si remains the same. Therefore, if Si accepts the challenger, no costs or
gains are incurred (EU
Si C1;C1ð Þ ¼ 0). However, if the incumbent is chosen, Si will remain
disenfranchised but pays a rejection cost, i.e., EU
Si C0;C1ð Þ ¼ s. Since
EU
Si C0;C1ð Þ\EU Si C1;C1ð Þ, Si 0s best response is to accept the challenger when he is
proposed.
Since Si will not revolt, Wi will not revolt either, because a revolution can be initiated
only when Si and Wi join forces. Hence, proposing the challenger always implies peaceful
leadership change.
Fig. 1 Game tree
15 We assume that the opposition needs to bear a rejection cost when the winning coalition proposes the
challenger. Since the winning coalition is the ruling party in the regime, the opposition need to engage in
certain activities, e.g., lobbying, riots, or strikes, to reject the winning coalition’s proposal.
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Proposition 1 When the winning coalition proposes the challenger, the opposition
always accepts the challenger as the next leader.
2.3.2 Revolution threshold when the incumbent is proposed
When the challenger is not proposed by the winning coalition and the opposition jointly
attempts a revolution, two scenarios could follow. First, if the incumbent rebuffs the
attempted uprising, then the opposition is forced to accept him. This happens with prob-
ability m1. Second, if the revolutionary attempt succeeds, then it costs k per resident and
the challenger democratizes the regime, i.e., he will set s to 1, w to its possible maximum,
and zj to 0.
16
We make the assumption of democratization here (like Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
2009) since in most cases revolutionaries are motivated by the promise of democratization.
However, political structures (i.e., s and w) sometimes would remain the same after a
successful revolution. Our results also hold for cases where no political structural changes
occur after a revolution succeeds.17
Here we show the condition required by Si to revolt, and then the condition required by
Wi. Finally we demonstrate the revolution threshold imposed by Si and Wi jointly and show
the probability of having a revolution if the winning coalition proposes the incumbent, i.e.,
q:
1. Si revolts if EU
Si C1;C0ð Þ[EU Si C0;C0ð Þ
The opposition takes into account how likely it is that a revolution attempt will be dis-
mantled and how costly it will be. For the residents outside the selectorate, Si, the fol-
lowing payoff is realized if they revolt:
EU
Si C1;C0ð Þ ¼ 1 E m0ð Þð Þ e1  kð Þ þ E m0ð Þ  0 ¼ 1 E m0ð Þð Þ e1  kð Þ:
If Si revolts successfully, the challenger will come into power, democratize the regime,
and deliver aggregate output e1. However, this only happens with probability 1 E m1ð Þ
and costs k. If Si cannot revolt successfully, they will receive zero since they then have
neither access to private rents nor to public goods. The same applies when the incumbent
decides not to revolt, i.e., EU
Si C0;C0ð Þ ¼ 0. Therefore, Si revolts when e1[ k, i.e., when
the challenger can provide agwill come into power with probabilitygregate output that is
larger than the revolution’s cost.
2. Wi revolts if EU
Wi C1;C0ð Þ[EU Wi C0;C0ð Þ
If Wi revolts, the challenger will come into power with probability 1 E m0ð Þ. If so, Wi
receives e1 and pays revolution cost, k. If the revolution is dismantled, Wi will receive his
current payoff, i.e., the public goods provided by the incumbent, e0 1 xð Þ. Therefore, the
expected utility for Wi to revolt is:
EU
Wi C1;C0ð Þ ¼ 1 E m0ð Þð Þ e1  kð Þ þ E m0ð Þe0 1 xð Þ
If Wi does not revolt, it will receive the public goods provided by the incumbent, i.e.,
EU
Wi C0;C0ð Þ ¼ e0 1 xð Þ. Therefore, it is beneficial for Wi to revolt when
16 Since the incumbent represents the status quo, he will not democratize the state.
17 A detailed proof is shown in the Appendix.
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e1[ k þ e0 1 xð Þ. This implies that selectorate members not included in the winning
coalition require the challenger to cover their revolution costs and provide more public
goods than the incumbent does.
3. Revolution threshold
Si requires e1[ k for a revolution while Wi requires e1[ k þ e0 1 xð Þ. Since revolutions
require participation from both groups, the opposition will revolt when e1[ k þ e0 1 xð Þ.
Proposition 2 When the winning coalition proposes the incumbent, the opposition will
revolt if e1[ k þ e0 1 xð Þ and accept the incumbent otherwise.
As e1 follows a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, this requirement is fulfilled with
probability q ¼ 1 k  1 xð Þe0. Furthermore, using backward induction, we know that
the expected economic competence of the challenger conditional on having a revolution is
Eðe1jRÞ ¼ 12 1þ k þ e0 1 xð Þð Þ:
2.3.3 Winning coalition’s expected utility
In this subsection, we discuss the expected utility of winning coalition members.
The expected utility of proposing the challenger (EUwi C1ð Þ) depends on the expected
economic competence of the challenger, E e1ð Þ, and the probability of remaining in the
coalition, w
s
. In other words, if the challenger comes into power, then the sitting winning
coalition will receive public goods for sure but private rents with probability w
s
.
At the beginning of the period, the winning coalition does not know anything about the
challenger, who is drawn randomly from the candidate pool. Since e1 U 0; 1½ , the
expected economic competence of the challenger, E e1ð Þ, equals 12. The expected utility of
proposing a challenger for the sitting winning coalition has two components: public goods
and private rents. The public goods component amounts to E e1ð Þð1 x), while the private
rents are E e1ð Þ xw. Since the probability for members of the sitting winning coalition to stay
in the winning coalition equals ws, we get that expected private rents equal E e1ð Þ xs.
Therefore, the expected utility of Wi when proposing the challenger is:








þ 1  x
 
Furthermore, the expected utility of Wi when proposing the incumbent is:
EUwi C0ð Þ ¼ q 1 E m0ð Þð Þ E e1jRð Þ  kð Þ






1 k þ e0 1 xð Þð Þ 1k 1xð Þe0ð Þ





This equation has two components: (1) the expected utility after a successful revolution,
which happens with probability q 1 E m0ð Þð Þ; where q is the probability of a revolution
attempt, and E m0ð Þ), which is the expected level of military competence of the incumbent,
and (2) the expected utility without a revolution, which happens with probability
1 q 1 E m0ð Þð Þ. The probability of having a successful revolution, 1 E m0ð Þð Þq, can be
expressed further as a U-shaped quadratic function of e0. It implies that after e0 reaches a
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certain level, greater economic competence induces a higher revolutionary threat. The
reason is that, although the opposition is less likely to revolt when the incumbent is
economically more competent, the incumbent cannot dismantle it when the opposition
revolts.
2.4 Leader survival
The next step in our analysis goes from the expected utilities under the incumbent and the
challenger to the expressions for leader survival.
The winning coalition will be more likely to stick with the incumbent if the incumbent
provides larger payoffs than the challenger does. We assume that the incumbent’s survival
ratio ps; ps 2 0; 1½ , is a strictly increasing function of d, which equals the difference
between the expected utility of choosing the incumbent and that of choosing the
challenger:
d ¼ EUwi C0ð Þ  EUwi C1ð Þ
Inserting the expressions derived for expected utility under the incumbent and the
challenger, respectively, we obtain:


























Since the incumbent’s survival ratio, ps; is a function strictly increasing in d, the
incumbent is more likely to survive as d gets larger. We are interested in how the
incumbent’s economic competence affects his survival. To that end, we take the first
derivative of ps with respect to e0. As
ops
oe0
has the same sign as odoe0, we calculate:
od
oe0















a 1 kð Þ2
ð3Þ
It can be observed immediately that the impact of competence on survival depends on




explore further how the impact of e0 on p
s evolves with the size of the winning coalition,








1 2 1 kð Þae0 þ 3 1 xð Þae20
  ð4Þ
On the basis of this equation, we consider how the incumbent’s economic competence
affects his survival rate and how this effect is moderated by the size of the winning
coalition.
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As the model is based on the assumption of a revolutionary threat, we here consider
only values of the exogenous parameters that are likely for such countries. That is,
countries facing revolutionary threats mostly have low income levels (revolution cost, k,
small) and high income inequality (x goes to 1). For these parameter values, we derive our
main proposition.18
Hypothesis 1 In the presence of a revolutionary threat, an increase in economic com-
petence reduces the probability of political survival (increases the hazard rate), but the
magnitude of the effect depends on the size of the winning coalition. As the winning
coalition grows larger, the probability of survival increases (the hazard rate declines). The
opposite holds for the effect of military competence.
The reason for the moderating effect of the winning coalition’s size is as follows.
Members of the winning coalition obtain more public goods and private rents from an
economically more competent incumbent as long as their access to private rents is secured.
Under this circumstance, for a given level of military competence, they would always favor
an economically more competent incumbent. However, economic competence comes at
the cost of less military competence. Hence, for every unit of additional welfare (due to
increased economic competence), they face a greater risk of losing private rents received
under the incumbent (owing to less military competence). As long as the winning coalition
is small, only a few members share the private rents. In such a case, winning coalition
members have a strong preference for a military competent leader and therefore the hazard
rate of economically competent leaders is high. However, when the winning coalition is
larger, less private rents per head relative to public goods accrue to winning coalition
members and an economically competent leader becomes more attractive.
As an extreme case, one could consider the situation when w approaches 0. In that case,
winning coalition members have a strong preference for militarily competent incumbents.
Despite the limited amount of output that is produced in such a case, the amount of private
rents per winning coalition member grows so large that a militarily competent incumbent is
always to be preferred. Even though, in practice, winning coalitions are never nil,
empirically it would correspond to a regression model in which there is no interaction
effect between the competence levels of the incumbent and the size of the winning
coalition. In a model for which we estimate the unconditional effect of economic (military)
competence on political survival we expect therefore a negative (positive) coefficient for
the respective competence variable(s).19
3 Model and data
In the remainder of the paper, we test hypothesis 1. Here, we describe our empirical model
and data. As we test our hypothesis within the framework of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2010), our empirical strategy closely follows theirs. The emphasis of our data discussion
below will be, therefore, on how we proxy for the competence levels of political leaders.
As to the empirical model, the selectorate theory predicts a decline over time in the
hazard rate of political leaders and this decline is greater for leaders in small-coalition
systems (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). The endogenous hazard rate makes the Cox
18 A proof with a numerical example and simulation can be found in the Appendix.
19 In fact, this is supported by the data. Results are available upon request.
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proportional hazard model inappropriate. Like Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), we,
therefore, estimate a parametric Weibull model where the hazard rate at year t is
h tð Þ ¼ pktp1; where p ¼ f wð Þ and k ¼ exp X0itb
 
:
As suggested by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), the hazard rate declines faster
over time for smaller coalitions (regardless of the competence levels of the political leader,
that is).20 Thus, p (the ancillary shape parameter) is modeled as a function of winning
coalition size, w, to capture this feature of the hazard rate. In addition, k is equal to
exp X0itb
 
), where Xit is a vector of independent variables measured for country i in year t;
b is a vector of coefficients corresponding to Xit. Throughout all model specifications, we
follow Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and include the size of the winning coalition
(w), the size of the selectorate(s), age of the incumbent (Age) and the interaction between
age and the size of the winning coalition (w*Age) as control variables in the regressions.21
The observations on age are taken from the Archigos dataset. Additionally we control for
GDP per capita (in natural logs) level and GDP’s annual growth rate. These variables are
taken from the World Bank Development Indicators 2013.22
The dependent variable of our study is the hazard rate of political leaders. To measure
leader changes, we use the Archigos dataset of Goemans et al. (2009). This dataset contains
information on the dates of entry and exit from office for the effective leader of every
independent country. The effective leader is that individual who exercised de facto
political power in the country, which can be a president, a king, a prime minister, and so
forth. The dataset contains information on 2098 leaders in 188 countries for the period
from 1875 to 2004. However, as our model applies only to countries facing a revolutionary
threat, we only use sub-samples of political leaders. In particular, we focus on non-
democratic leaders and leaders who were in power in times of (greater) political unrest. We
propose to distinguish between democracies and autocracies, as revolutionary threats may
be less likely in democracies than in autocracies. To distinguish between political systems,
we rely on the classification of Cheibub et al. (2010). As to distinguishing between political
leaders that face political turmoil and other leaders, we take the measure proposed by
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), which is based on the change in the level of mass
demonstrations, riots, strikes and revolutions over a three-year period (labeled as Mass3).
In turn, we focus on countries that faced sharp increases or reductions in mass civil protests
and revolutions.23
20 To test for robustness, we also estimated our model using other distributional assumptions for the shape
of the hazard rate, such as Gompertz, Log-Logistic, Log-normal, exponential and the gamma distribution.
We find the lowest AIC and BIC statistics for our proposed Weibull model. Furthermore, our results are not
sensitive to any of the assumptions made. Results are available upon request.
21 We also follow the approach of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) by using time-varying covariates.
We have estimated our model also using alternative treatments of the covariates, such as including lagged
values, initial values, or duration-specific averages, but this did not alter our findings. The results are
available upon request.
22 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) included other controls, such as the non-tax revenue, official
development assistance and net oil exports, all as percentages of GDP. However, including these controls
significantly shrinks our dataset. Thus, we follow them by including only the current GDP per capita level
and annual growth rate. Additionally, we tested those controls’ lagged values, tenure averages, and the
values at the beginning of tenures. The main results remain the same.
23 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) construct an index measuring the level of mass political events.
This index is based on antigovernment demonstrations, riots, general strikes and revolutions, which are
taken from Banks and Wilson (2007). Their index is an equally weighted sum of the four measures of mass
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Our main explanatory variables are economic and military competence of the political
leader. As a proxy for economic competence we follow Besley et al. (2011), who find that
better educated leaders cause better economic outcomes and, therefore, we use data on the
educational attainment of the political leader obtained before entering office. Likewise, we
use data on military ranks (held before entering office) to proxy for military competence.
Our data on leader characteristics are taken mainly from Ludwig (2002), but supple-
mented with information from other sources.24 Following Ludwig (2002), the educational
attainment of a leader is categorized as follows: (1) illiterate (no formal education); (2)
literate (no formal education); (3) elementary/primary school education or tutors; (4) high/
finishing/secondary/trade school; (5) special training (beyond high school, such as
mechanical, nursing, art, music, or military training25; (6) college educated; (7) qualifi-
cations from a graduate or professional school (e.g., master’s degree); and (8) doctorates
(e.g., Ph.D.). To maintain consistency with, e.g. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011), we
transform the eight-way classification into a four-way classification (labeled: Education4).
Education4 contains discrete numbers from 0 to 3 and has a value of zero if the educational
attainment is below the college level, 1 if leaders have a college degree, 2 if leaders have a
master’s degree, and 3 if leaders have a Ph.D. degree.26 We have information on educa-
tional attainment for 1710 political leaders, but (in line with our theoretical model) will
focus below only on political leaders of autocratic countries and leaders that have faced
revolutionary threats.
Apart from absolute educational attainment, we also construct two relative measures
because, for example, a college graduate in a country like Chad (where the literacy rate is
only about 35 %),27 is considered to be highly educated whereas in a developed country
like Canada 50 % of the population has a bachelor’s degree. Our relative measure is based
on the political leader’s educational attainment relative to years of education of the average
citizen of the country.28 For country-level data on educational attainment, we use
Footnote 23 continued
political movements after standardization. Unfortunately, Banks’s measures rely on media coverage, which
may contain reporting biases and societal norms. To ameliorate these potential problems, Bueno de Mes-
quita and Smith (2010) suggest using the change in the level of mass political events over the previous
3 years (i.e., Mass3). For the same reason, we also use Mass3 as our preferred measure of mass movements.
For more details, see Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010). Our empirical results do not change if the
original measure (based on levels) is entered.
24 The priority order regarding the source of our data collection is: (1) Ludwig (2002); (2) Encyclopedia
Britannica; (3) Keesing’s World News Archive, (4) Series of Who’s Who and LexContent5 (provided by
LexisNexis Academic search); (5) Biographies on government websites; (6) www.rulers.org; and (7)
Wikipedia. We compared the information collected from the first six sources with Besley and Reynal-Querol
(2011) and conclude that the datasets correlate highly (r = 0.93). We used Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011)
to fill in few gaps in our dataset.
25 Military training programs that do not confer a bachelor’s degree fall into this category. These programs
normally issue a certificate rather than a degree after completion. Military academy graduates are counted as
college graduates.
26 Using an eight-way classification instead of a four-way classification does not alter any of our findings.
The results are available upon request.
27 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html.
28 To construct this measure, we follow the mapping of Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) of educational
attainment into years: (1) illiterate (no formal education) = 0 years; (2) literate (no formal educa-
tion) = 2 years; (3) grade/elementary/primary school or tutors = 6 years; (4) high/finishing/sec-
ondary/trade school = 12 years (?6); (5) special training (beyond high school, such as mechanical, nursing,
art, music or military training) = 16 (?4) years; (6) college = 16 (?4) years; (7) graduate or professional
school (e.g., master’s degree) = 18 years (?2); (8) doctorate (e.g., Ph.D.) = 20 years (?2).
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information from Barro and Lee (2013) (this relative measure is labeled Education dis-
tance (BL)) and, to obtain a longer time series, from Morrisson and Murtin (2012) (this
relative measure is labeled Education distance(MM)).
We construct measures of military competence on the basis of military rank. We cat-
egorize leaders according to the highest military rank they have reached before they
assume power. We adopt the NATO coding with respect to the ranking of officers, which
goes from OF-1 (e.g., Lieutenant in the United States) to OF-10 (e.g., five-star US General,
a rank filled only in wartime) and construct a variable (labeled: NATO rank that goes from
0 (civilian or ranks below OF-1) to 10 (OF-10)).29
We consider the military rank of a political leader to be a good proxy for military
competence as it can capture how well the incumbent is able to avoid the uprising of the
opposition (or defeat the opposition). This can be either because high ranked leaders have
superb military and tactical skills, but also because they have stronger ties to the military to
protect their position and that of the political elite.
To maintain consistency between our competence variables, we also construct a mea-
sure based on four categories for military competence (Military4). This variable is cate-
gorized as follows. (1) Civilians (with no prior military experience); (2) low-ranked
officers (from OF-1 to OF-4); (3) middle-ranked officers (from OF-5 to OF-8); and (4)
high-ranked officers (OF-9 to OF-10). This variable, together with Education4, are the key
explanatory variables in our empirical analysis.
As Education4 and Military4 are categorical variables, we present summary data in a
two-way table in Table 2 and test the independence of the two competence dimensions
using a v2 test. We reject the null-hypothesis of independence at the 1 % significance
level.30
To examine the relation between educational and military attainment further, we
show in Fig. 2 the conditional distribution of military attainment for different levels of
educational attainment. As educational attainment increases from less than college to
doctorate, the proportion of civilians rises from below 60 % to around 95 %. In
Table 1 Ranks of NATO army officers
NATO code UK US FR
OF-10 Field Marshal General of the Army Marechal de France
OF-9 General General General d’Armree
OF-8 Lieutenant-General Lieutenant-General General de Corps d’Armree
OF-7 Major-General Major-General General de Division
OF-6 Brigadier Brigadier-General General de Brigade
OF-5 Colonel Colonel Colonel
OF-4 Lieutenant-Colonel Lieutenant-Colonel Lieutenant-Colonel
OF-3 Major Major Commandant







Source STANAG 2116 NATO chart (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranks_and_insignia_of_NATO_armies_
officers)
29 An overview of the NATO coding is provided in Table 1.
30 Pearson Chi squared(9) = 161.1754, Pr = 0.000.
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addition, the proportion of high-rank officers is greater in categories of lesser educa-
tional attainment. For leaders with college/less than a college education, around 20 %
have a high-rank military background, while for leaders with a master’s or Ph.D.
degree, fewer than 5 % attain a high military rank. From this, we cannot merely
conclude that the two competence dimensions are correlated. We can also conclude that
they are substitutes.
To test proposition 1, we also require data on winning coalition size and selectorate
size. To that end, we follow Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), who have extended
the work of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), and construct w (the size of the winning
coalition) on the basis of Polity IV data and Banks and Wilson (2007). It is constructed
as follows: 0.25 points are added to w for each of the following conditions that is
fulfilled within a country: (1) if the regime type is defined as nonmilitary according to
Banks and Wilson (2007); (2) if the chief executive is not chosen by heredity or in
rigged, unopposed elections (i.e., the variable XRCOMP C 2, according to Polity IV); (3)
if the executive is recruited openly (i.e., the variable XROPEN[ 2 according to Polity
IV); and (4) if a competitive party system is in place (i.e., the variable, PARCOMP = 5,
according to Polity IV). As a result, w ranges from 0 to 1.31 The selectorate size, s, is
constructed using Banks and Wilson’s (2007) legislative selection variable, which is
coded zero if there is no legislature, one if the selection is non-elective (as is the case in
heredity or ascription), and 2 if the legislature is elected. Dividing the legislative
selection variable by 2 yields a measure for s that also lies between 0 and 1. The
availability of s and w reduces our sample to 166 countries.32





College Master Doctorate Total
Military
attainment
(Education4= 0) (Education4= 1) (Education4= 2) (Education4= 3)
Civilian
(Military4 = 0)
258 (312.7) 467 (515.7) 292 (237.2) 301 (152.4) 1218 (1218.0)
Low-rank officer
(Military4 = 1)








75 (57.2) 130 (94.4) 14 (43.4) 4 (27.9) 223 (223.0)
Total 439 724 333 314 1710
Pearson chi2(9) = 161.1754, Pr = 0.000
Expected counts are reported in parentheses
31 It should be noted that a one-to-one mapping between the selectorate theory and the proxy at hand does
not exist (Clarke and Stone 2008). Yet, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2008) argue that, despite this obvious
limitation, the proxies reflect the winning coalition and the selectorate, respectively, in the theoretically
predicted direction.
32 A summary of all descriptive statistics related to our data is reported in Table 9.
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4 Empirical results
We estimate in Tables 3 and 4 models similar to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010).
Whereas Table 4 focuses on the subsample containing autocratic political leaders, Table 3
focuses on political leaders that have been in power during times of political uprising (in
both democracies and autocracies).
In column 1 of Tables 3 and 4, we test the impact of economic competence (and its
interaction with the size of the winning coalition) on political survival. In column 2 of the
respective tables, we replace economic competence by military competence. In column 3,
we enter both competence variables and their interaction with the size of the winning
coalition simultaneously and, lastly, in column 4 we add additional control variables that
are also used by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010).33
We observe that the variables of interest in our model are estimated with the expected
sign and are significant at (at least) the 5 % significance level. To interpret our results
regarding proposition 1, we calculate the marginal effect of educational attainment and
military attainment on the leader’s hazard rate for different sizes of the winning coalition
(based on the estimates in columns (3) of Tables 3 and 4). The results are plotted in Figs. 3
and 4. It can be seen in the left panel that the marginal effect of educational attainment is
significant for small winning coalitions as both lines of the 95 % confidence interval are
above zero. This implies that highly educated leaders have the highest hazard rates when
the winning coalition is small. This effect, however, disappears when w goes to 1. The
reverse holds for military attainment (right panel), i.e., leaders with higher military ranks
are more likely to survive in small-coalition regimes, while this is not necessarily true in
large-coalition regimes.
In addition, most of the control variables in Tables 3 and 4 are significant. We find
that small winning coalitions and big selectorates reduce the hazard rate. Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith (2010) explain that a larger selectorate implies a smaller probability
of being part of the winning coalition. Knowing this, members of the winning coalition
Fig. 2 The distribution of military ranks for different education attainments
33 Unfortunately, adding these additional control variables reduces our sample to about 1500 observations,
which is approximately a reduction of 30 %. We, therefore, proceed with the larger sample and for the most
part base our conclusions on the results obtained from it.
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prefer to stick with the incumbent, which implies a lower hazard rate. Naturally, the
opposite holds for the size of the winning coalition as, by definition, the probability of
being part of the winning coalition is low when the size of the coalition is small. In all of
our specifications, the age of the incumbent has a positive effect on the hazard rate. As
the incumbent ages, the chances rise that he either will die a natural death, or that he will
be replaced. Again, this effect is moderated by the size of the winning coalition. Not
surprisingly, high-income levels and high economic growth rates are associated with low
hazard rates.
As explained above, crucial to our model is the assumption that the winning coalition
(and the political leader) is facing a threat of revolution. Therefore, we expect that our
empirical results will not hold up if we select a sample in which leaders do not face such a
threat. To that end, we show results in Table 5 for subsamples with (i.e., the odd columns)
and without a revolutionary threat (i.e., the even columns). That is, we also run placebo
regressions on a sample of countries that are stable with respect to mass political uprisings
(columns 2 and 4) as well as a sample of democracies (columns 6 and 8). Our results
confirm our hypothesis. That is, the estimated coefficients of the models reported in the
even columns (i.e., countries without a revolutionary threat) are by and large all
insignificant.
Fig. 3 The ME of Education4/Military4 on leader’s hazard rate (when facing uprisings). The figure shows
the marginal effect of the impact of leader’s education attainment (left)/military attainment (right) on
leader’s hazard rate (vertical axis) for different values of w (horizontal axis). The estimates are taken from
Table 3, column (3) where leaders are facing uprisings. Furthermore, the 95 % confidence interval is plotted
(solid lines). The dots refer to the observations indicate the value of w for all observations included the
sample. The tight dots refer to when the marginal effect is zero
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5 Robustness analysis
To probe the robustness of our results, we provide in Table 6 (for leaders facing political
turmoil) and in Table 7 (for autocratic leaders) estimates using alternative measures of
economic competency. We have reflected on these alternative measures in the data sec-
tion. In column 1, we replace our economic competencemeasure by themeasure proposed by
Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011), which is the number of years of schooling that the leader
obtained. In columns 2 and 3, we insert educational attainment of the leader relative to the
average citizen of the country. In column 2, the average educational attainment is proxied by
themeasure of Barro and Lee (2013), while in column 3we use themeasure ofMorrisson and
Murtin (2012). In column 4, we follow Besley et al. (2011) and insert two dummy variables
for educational attainment. The first dummy is equal to one if the leader has at least a college
degree, while the second dummy is equal to one if the leader has at least a master’s degree. In
all cases we find that the coefficient of educational attainment is positive while the interaction
term is negative, which lends support for our hypothesis. However, in the case of educational
distance (columns 2 and 3 of Table 6), the estimate is not significant.
As to military attainment, we check for robustness in two ways. First, we treat the
NATO classification as a numeric variable. Second, we insert dummy variables capturing
low-rank officers, middle rank officers and high-rank officers. In both cases we find that the
estimated coefficients are of the expected sign and all significant at the 1 % significance
Fig. 4 The ME of Education4/Military4 on leader’s hazard rate. (in autocracies). The figure shows the
marginal effect of the impact of leader’s education attainment (left)/military attainment (right) on leader’s
hazard rate (vertical axis) for different values of w (horizontal axis). The estimates are taken from Table 4,
column (3) where leaders are from autocracies. Furthermore, the 95 % confidence interval is plotted (solid
lines). The dots refer to the observations indicate the value of w for all observations included the sample.
The tight dots refer to when the marginal effect is zero
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level. One notable result is that the coefficients on high-rank officers are larger than the
coefficients on middle/low-rank officers, which suggests that especially high-rank officers
are able to secure their position in office.
Table 3 Leader survival facing political uprising
(1) (2) (3) (4)
_t Education4 0.554*** 0.406*** 0.309**
(0.103) (0.106) (0.130)
w*Education4 -0.650*** -0.475*** -0.374**
(0.135) (0.136) (0.170)
Military4 -0.436*** -0.363*** -0.418***
(0.087) (0.091) (0.108)










w 3.776*** 1.733** 2.932*** 1.952
(0.732) (0.744) (0.770) (1.214)
s -0.802*** -0.679*** -0.866*** -1.136***
(0.137) (0.144) (0.137) (0.167)
Age 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.042***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
w*Age -0.048*** -0.041*** -0.045*** -0.050***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Constant -3.382*** -1.665*** -2.603*** -2.078***
(0.430) (0.412) (0.462) (0.751)
Ln(p) w 0.275 0.422** 0.286 0.270*
(0.173) (0.167) (0.185) (0.151)
Constant -0.363*** -0.551*** -0.375*** -0.262***
(0.095) (0.083) (0.100) (0.096)
Observations 4658 4810 4658 2985
Log Lik -1614 -1877 -1597 -892.4
Ncountry 160 160 160 144
Nsubject 1382 1501 1382 859
Nfailure 936 1042 936 590
Here a parametric Weibull model is estimated with the hazard rate at year t being the dependent variable.
The ancillary shape parameter, p, is a function of w. The sample is restricted to leaders that have been in
power during times of political uprising. Political uprising is defined as changes in the level of mass
demonstrations, riots, strikes and revolutions over a three-year period (Mass3[0). Robust standard errors in
parentheses, *** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
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To further examine the robustness of our results, we analyze different subsamples of our
data set. These results are reported in Table 8.
In column 1 and 2 of Table 8, observations from sub-Saharan Africa are removed from
the sample. Leaders who reached power by irregular means are dropped in columns 3 and 4
and, furthermore, columns 5 and 6 include observations only on leaders who reached
Table 4 Leader survival in autocracies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
_t Education4 0.739*** 0.590*** 0.414***
(0.115) (0.139) (0.149)
w*Education4 -1.039*** -0.709** -0.513
(0.247) (0.293) (0.316)
Military4 -0.471*** -0.379*** -0.405***
(0.097) (0.104) (0.120)










w 4.282*** 1.123 2.490 -1.907
(1.589) (1.432) (1.692) (2.527)
s -1.044*** -0.748*** -1.011*** -1.224***
(0.177) (0.193) (0.182) (0.208)
Age 0.043*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.065***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
w*Age -0.048* -0.039 -0.039 -0.085***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.030) (0.032)
Constant -4.144*** -2.038*** -3.236*** -1.588*
(0.615) (0.491) (0.649) (0.885)
Ln(p) w -0.458* -0.414* -0.531** -0.394
(0.236) (0.249) (0.268) (0.294)
Constant -0.141 -0.355*** -0.134 -0.135
(0.094) (0.093) (0.101) (0.111)
Observations 4517 4623 4517 3006
Log Lik -804.6 -1013 -790.9 -501.3
Ncountry 124 124 124 109
Nsubject 591 665 591 415
Nfailure 407 474 407 291
Here a parametric Weibull model is estimated with the hazard rate at year t being the dependent variable.
The ancillary shape parameter, p, is a function of w. The sample is restricted to leaders in autocratic regimes.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
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power through regular means.34 For each subsample, we first focus on the sample with
revolutionary threats (columns 1, 3, 5) and then we focus on regimes under autocratic
rulers (columns 2, 4, 6).
Throughout the table, the coefficients for Education4 and w*Education4 consistently
have the expected signs and are significant at 5 % level. Moreover, the coefficients for
Military4 generally are negative and significant. Although the coefficients for w*Military
Table 8 Robustness analysis: subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













































































































































Observations 3940 2904 3609 2894 3555 2780
Log Lik -1443 -554.4 -1264 -447.8 -1254 -434.1
Ncountry 116 81 155 119 155 119
Nsubject 1199 419 1123 375 1110 364
Nfailure 828 280 772 270 763 262
Here a parametric Weibull model is estimated with the hazard rate at year t being the dependent variable.
The ancillary shape parameter, p, is a function of w. While columns 1, 3, 5 focus on the sample with
revolutionary threats, columns 2, 4, 6 focus on regimes under autocratic rulers. In addition, observations
from sub-Saharan Africa are removed from the sample in columns 1 and 2. Leaders who reached power by
irregular means are dropped in columns 3 and 4 and, furthermore, columns 5 and 6 include observations
only on leaders who reached power through regular means Robust standard errors in parentheses,
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
34 The information on leaders’ entry modes are obtained from Archigos 2.9, where entry modes are
categorized into three types, i.e., through regular means, irregular means, and foreign intervention. Entry by
regular means represents leaders who are selected into political office in a manner prescribed by either
explicit rules or established conventions. If the leader is not directly imposed by a foreign state, then he
reaches office by irregular means, which include, for example, coup d’e´tats and civil wars.
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Table 9 Summary of statistics
Variable Definition Source Obs Mean SD Min Max
Eduction4 Education attainment of the
incumbent before office
Various sources 11,197 1.05 0.97 0 3
Military4 The highest military rank
achieved before office
Various sources 12,032 0.67 1.11 0 3





12,097 0.58 0.3 0 1
s The size of the selectorate Bueno de
Mesquita and
Smith (2010)
12,097 0.86 0.33 0 1
Age The age of the incumbent Archigos
(2009)
12,097 55.47 11.72 15 93






5956 7.41 1.54 4.28 10.91




5931 3.65 6.34 -50.25 106.28
Mass A measure of revolutionary






9196 0.08 0.75 -0.37 4.66
Mass The change in the level of
mass over the previous




8437 0.01 0.81 -3.99 4.32
Education
years
The numbers of years the
incumbent spent on
education




The numbers of years the
incumbent spent on
education relative to that








The numbers of years the
incumbent spent on
education relative to that








The highest military rank
achieved before office
(NATO-system)
Various sources 12,032 1.89 3.51 0 10
College A dummy variable, which
equals 1 if the incumbent
has a college degree or
above and 0 otherwise
Various sources 14,379 0.65 0.48 0 1
Graduate A dummy variable, which
equals 1 if the incumbent
has a master degree or
above and 0 otherwise
Various sources 14,379 0.27 0.44 0 1
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are less significant in the subsamples, the coefficients are positive when leaders face a
revolutionary threat. Therefore, we confirm that our main results are not driven by African
leaders or by leaders who came into office through irregular means, such as coup d’e´tats.
6 Conclusion
The literature on political survival has shown that many features of the political, economic,
and institutional landscape influence the survival of political leaders. In this paper we show
that the survival of political leaders also depends on the leader himself (or herself). We
have extended the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) by allowing for
heterogeneous political leaders. By focusing on the motives of the winning coalition, we
have derived the proposition that, under a revolutionary threat, economic competence can
be detrimental to political survival, but that the effect is moderated by the size of the
winning coalition. As the winning coalition grows, the negative effect of economic
competence on political survival falls. On the other hand, military competence can increase
the chance of political survival. However, again, the effect depends on the size of the
winning coalition. Military competence of the political leader is important when the
winning coalition is small, as the members obtain considerable private rents and, hence,
care about maintaining their position in the winning coalition.
Our empirical results confirm the predictions of our model. We conclude that in order to
understand political survival of leaders it is not sufficient to look at only the economic,
political, and institutional context. The personal characteristics of political leaders also are
important determinants that contribute to the understanding of political survival. Most
interestingly, our results suggest that these personal characteristics interact with the
institutional context and that a leader with certain characteristics is more able to survive in
one context or another.
Naturally, our study has its limitations. For instance, our model assumes that the country
under investigation suffers from a revolutionary threat. This implies that the model is rep-
resentative only of a subset of all countries and that it does not apply to stable democracies.
For stable democracies, one could argue that military competence is less relevant and that
other forms of competence play a role in securing the support of the winning coalition. One
could think of political competence, e.g., how well a politician can run a political campaign
or how well he is able to manage a (coalition) government. Another limitation relates to the
measurement of our competence variables, especially military competence. Using military
ranks, based on the NATO classification system, is a crude way of proxying the latent
concept of military competence. It may well be that in autocracies higher military ranks
simply reflect the fact that someone belongs to the right network (which is analogous to the
argument respecting political competence in democracies). It may also well be that non-
commissioned officers with battlefield experience (e.g., sergeants) outperform commis-
sioned officers that received mainly academic training. We believe, however, that such cases
are rare and that our approach is a feasible way of making comparative analysis possible. Of
course, reflecting on empirical results that we would have obtained when better proxies
would have been available is highly speculative. Improving upon measurement issues and
developing a framework that also is able to understand political survival in stable democ-
racies sets a natural agenda for further research.
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